Challenge and Response in Family Law by Rheinstein, Max
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 17 
Issue 1 Issue 1 - December 1963 Article 18 
12-1963 
Challenge and Response in Family Law 
Max Rheinstein 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Family Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Max Rheinstein, Challenge and Response in Family Law, 17 Vanderbilt Law Review 239 (1963) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol17/iss1/18 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Challenge and Response in Family Law
Max PRheinstein*
What has the challenge been in family law? What has been the
response of the fashioners of American law?
The challenge has been twofold: both the structure and the
functions of the American family have undergone profound trans-
formations. They have been concomitant with the process of in-
dustrialization and urbanization that has changed the social structure
of the country during the last hundred years.
Sociologists distinguish between the nuclear and the extended
family.' The former is that small group of the household composed of
a husband, his wife, and those of their children who have not yet
left the parental home. The extended family consists of that wider
group of persons who are related by blood or marriage and among
whom ties of community are felt so strongly that they constitute a
group facing the outside world with a certain measure of solidarity
and that the members feel strong obligations of mutual help. Recently
the concept of the modified extended family has been developed to
signify that grouping of parents, children living at home, children who
have left the home, and the latters' spouses and offspring, in which
appreciable feelings of solidarity and mutual responsibility give a
measure of cohesiveness.2 In an immigrant country, such as the
United States, the extended family has never been so common as in
stay-at-home countries. Immigrants came here as individuals or in
nuclear family groups. But once the immigrants were settled, the
pattern of the extended family did tend to grow up, although it never
reached that degree of strength it once had in such countries as
Italy, Poland, or Scotland. Industrialization and urbanization have
intensified the American's ready inclination toward migration and his
individualist disregard of such traditional ties as those of blood and
soil; the result is that the modest pattern of the extended family
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1. Until recently, American sociologists tended to the view that the nuclear family
is "the" family type of the contemporary United States. The definitive formulation
of this view is contained in the article by Talcott Parsons, The Kinship System of the
Contemporary United States, 45 AmaucAN ANTROPOLOGIST 22 (1943); see also
PARSONS & BAL.S, FA1mmy, SOCIAJZAON AND INTERACTION PROCESS (1955).
2. This view has been initiated by Eugene Litwak, Occupational Mobility and
Extended Family Cohesion, and Geographical Mobility and Extended Family Co-
hesion, 25 AmEnIcAN SocIoLoGcL REv. 385 (1960); see also Sussman, The Isolated
Nuclear Family: Fact or Fiction?, 6 SocIAL PROBLEMS 333 (1959).
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that once existed here has been transformed into a pattern of nuclear
families without, however, completely destroying all feelings of rela-
tionship among brothers, in-laws, uncles, nephews, nieces, aunts, and
cousins, not to speak of parents on the one side and their married
children and the latters' spouses and children on the other.
The second and more far-reaching impact exercised upon the family
by industrialization and urbanization has been the transformation of
its functions. 3 In 1860, the majority of Americans lived on farms or in
small towns; 4 in 1960, 69.9 per cent of all Americans were inhabitants
of urban communities. In such communities the role of the family
is different from what it was on the farm, and even today's farm fam-
ily is no longer what it was a hundred years ago.
The old-type family was the principal institution that was supposed
to serve, and actually did serve, numerous functions which it now
shares with other social institutions.5 At the risk of oversimplification
the principal functions of the old-time family may be stated as follows:
On the farm, as well as among urban craftsmen and shopkeepers, or
even with respect to larger-scale commercial enterprise, the family
was the basic unit of production, of worship (shared with the church),
education, recreation, care of the sick, the old, and the needy, and of
consumption.
Of these functions only the last is still regarded as the peculiar
domain of the family, and even here the function of the family has
to some extent been taken over by the business man's club, the plant
canteen, and the lunch counter. In worship the role of both family
and church has decreased, but the former's more than that of the
latter. The care of the sick and the needy has increasingly been
assumed by philanthropic institutions and, above all, by the state. In
education the school has come to outrank the family.
In the former tasks of the family a shrinkage has thus taken place.
That does not mean, however, that the social role of the family
has lost importance. Needs have arisen or have been intensified
of which the present-day urban family is expected to take care. The
most important of these new needs is that of providing the necessary
counterweight to the modern city dwellers' isolation from nature and
from those human contacts which were provided by such old-time
institutions as the neighborhood or the congregation. These needs of
3. The classical paper on the transformation of the functions of the family in
American society is Ogburn, The Family and Its Functions, in PRESIDENT'S REsEAncH
CoMII-rEE ON SOCIAL TRENDS, REcENT SOCIAL TRENDS 661 (1934).
4. In 1860, only 19.8 per cent of the population was urban.
5. A "theory of shared functions" has recently been developed by Eugene Litwak
in a paper titled Extended Kin Relations in an Industrial Democratic Society (pre-




tension management cannot be completely fulfilled by the clubs,
cocktail parties, and other institutions of urban life. Modern man
seeks the indispensable community where he was less used to seek
it in earlier times-in the family or, more precisely, in marriage. In
the tradition of Christianity, marriage has long been defined as the
consortium omnis vitae, the total community of life in all and every
respect.6 In reality this ideal was rarely achieved or even expected.
For the farmer of the sod home frontier, who advertised in a New
York paper for a healthy wife used to farm work, the wife was
expected to be the partner in sex and work and the mother of the
children. What he hardly expected was to find in her the comrade
with whom he could share his innermost feelings, at whom he could
unburden himself of the worries and frustrations of life, who would
share his tastes in literature, arts, and music, and who would provide
for him the quiet haven of refuge within a stormy and complex world.
7
All such "tension management" is expected of marriage in modem
urban life, and it is expected by both partners. The expectations
and aspirations of the female have come to count. Here we touch
on another of those great social trends which have contributed essen-
tially to the transformation of the family-female emancipation. We
need not trace it here in detail. Suffice it to mention that women
now have the suffrage, that they are eligible for practically every kind
of public office, and, above all, that as workers women have stepped
out of the home, the family farm, and the family enterprise. By 1960
one-third of all American married women were engaged in work
outside of the home.8
Our survey of the transformation of the family as a social institu-
tion has been sketchy, crude, and oversimplifying. It ought to suffice,
however, to indicate that the family of the 1960's widely differs from
that of the 1860's, and that, consequently, changes have occurred in
6. This view of marriage has its root in pre-Christian ideals. Cf. L. 1. Dig. de tit.
nupt. (23.2): "Nuptiae sunt conjunctio mars et feminae et consortium omnis vitae,
divini et humani iuris communicatio."
7. Old-style "institutional marriage" is said to have been replaced by modem
"companionship marriage." BuRGEss & LocKE, THE FAmmLy FROM INs-rrUTION TO
COMP'ANIONSmI (2d ed. 1950), especially chapter 16, The American Family in Transi-
tion.
8. 41.7 per cent of all married women residing with their husbands worked at
some time during the year 1959; one-third of them (32.5 per cent) worked full-time
for at least fifty weeks. UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISnTCS, SPECIAL LABOR FORCE: REPORTS No. 11, Table E, at A-11. "90 percent of
the women reaching adulthood today will hold jobs at some time during their lives,
whereas only half of their counterparts 60 years ago might have been expected to
work." Mahoney, Factors Determining the Labor Force Participation of Married
Women, 14 ImN. & LAB. REL. REV. 563 (1961). In 1949 the percentage of married
women engaged in outside work was 22; in 1890 it was 4.6. BtmGEss & LocE, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 504.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the reality of those human relationships which in their totality make
up the family. Concomitant with these transformations of the factual
content of these relationships has been a change in the normative
expectations. How ought a husband and his wife behave toward each
other? What is the proper conduct of parents toward their children
and vice versa? The mere statement of these questions will evoke the
uncertainty of the answers in all the norm systems which address
themselves to man: the religious, the ethical, that of social convention,
and that of the law. The answers must be uncertain and groping,
especially if they have to be, as those of the law, uniform for all
families concerned.9
When we speak of the transformations of the family as a social
institution, that is, of transformations in the realm of the factual
rather than the normative, we must not overlook the fact that not
all the American families of the 1960's are of the new pattern. Old-
style families survive, perhaps more than we are inclined to believe
at first sight. Those families which constitute the new patterns in
full purity may be comparatively few. Most American families fol-
low a variety of patterns between the extremes. The trend from the
old family pattern to the new unmistakably exists. The extent to
which it has come to be actualized varies, one might almost say, from
family to family. No wonder that no unity of normative expectations
has arisen from this welter of different facts. But even if the trans-
formation had been more complete in the realm of the factual one
ought not to expect a fully corresponding transformation in the realm
of the normative. Norms of etiquette and convention may change in
fairly rapid sequence with the formation of patterns of actual social
conduct, but ethical normative convictions are more resistant. A new
social pattern emerging in nonconformity with long-held ethical
convictions will meet with disapproval rather than provoke a quick
adaptation of the old ethical norm to the new social facts. Even
more vigorous will be the resistance of religious norms regarded as
revealed by God Himself, and thus immutable by man. By their
very nature as the stewards of the divine revelation, the churches
have, of necessity, been inclined to maintain unsullied their norms of
family and sex life which for centuries have been regarded as those
of Christianity. What part of this norm system is of the essence of
Christian revelation and what is accidental interpretation and addi-
tion? What can be shed and what must be preserved? Varying
answers have been given, with considerable differences between
liberal Protestants, Fundamentalists, and Catholics.' ° The answers
9. Cf. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce (pts. 1-2), 32 CoLum. L. REV. 1281
(1932), 33 COLUr. L. REV. 249 (1933).
10. For a critical survey of the position taken by religious bodies and writers in
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given by non-theologian leaders in moral philosophy have varied too,
influenced as many of them are by religious traditions. But even
among purely secular thinkers, unanimity cannot be found.'
What, in such a situation, shall be the norms of the law? The
answer is comparatively easy in a country of comparative homogeneity
of religious and ethical convictions such as, for instance, on one side,
Italy, or on another, Sweden. In the former, the law of marriage
coincides with that of the Roman Catholic Church." In the latter,
the law has come to conform more or less to the norms of Protestant
and secular liberalism.n The answer is also not too difficult in a
country in which the norm system of right conduct is formulated by
a dominant group such as the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. The
family law will conform to the party line and it will follow the
party line's changes. 13 However, that it has not been easy for all
one-party states to develop clear and undisputed norms of family life
has been shown by such examples as National Socialist Germany,
14
Communist Poland,15 or one-party Ghana.'
6
How much more difficult is it to work out norms of law which, as
they ideally should, correspond to the prevailing norms of religion,
ethics, and convention in a society in which widely divergent con-
victions are held and in which none of the divergent convictions is
supposed to dominate and prevail over the others? The task with
which the fashioners of American family law have been confronted
has not been an easy one. The answers they have developed, or
rather the standards that have emerged, are far from being universally
satisfying. By and large one wonders that they have not been worse.
Most of them result in decisions that appear fair and just. In a
considerable measure this result is due to the fact that few family
disputes ever go beyond the level of the trial court, which sees the
parties, their troubles and their miseries, and which feels itself less
bound by the norms of the official law than an appellate court. In-
deed, there has grown up in family law a dichotomy of the law of
Germany, see MuLLEa-FRmENFELS, EHE uxND RE 73 (1962). For a list of pamphlets
published by American church bodies, see DUVALL, FAMILY LIVING 399 (1950).
11. Treaty between the Holy See and Italy, Feb. 11, 1929, Law of May 27, 1929,
n. 810, Gazzetta Ufficiale, June 5, 1929, n. 130 (Italy).
12. Karlsson, Social Policies and Marriage Stability in Sweden, 9 ANNALES DE LA
FACULTE DE DRorr D'IsTANBtL 246 n.13 (1960); cf. Segerstedt & Weintraub, Marriage
and Divorce in Sweden, 272 ANNALS 185 (1950).
13. See GazYBowsirr, SovmlT LEGAL INsTrrTUTONS (1962); Gsovsia, SovIET CiVI
LAw III (1948); HAzARD & SHImo, THE SovIE'r LEGAL SYSTEM, pt. III, 99 (1962).
14. See WoLF, SCHEIDUNG UND Scr DuNGsREcHT 78 (1959).
15. Cf. Czachorski, Donn6es statistiques sur le divorce en Pologne, 9 ANNALES DE LA
FACULTE DE DROT DIsTANBUL 293 n.13 (1960).
16. For a general survey, see Rheinstein, Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law of
Western Countries, 18 LA-w & CoNTEM,. PROB. 3 (1953).
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the books and the law in action, a dichotomy which is most con-
spicuous in matters of divorce,17 but which can also be observed
in other areas, especially the law of family support or of guardianship.
Generally it can be said, however, that the norms which were estab-
lished as norms of law in conformity with the then dominant con-
victions about norms of religion and ethics have been preserved
as norms of law, especially of the law of the books, but often also as
the law in action, with the result that the law has not only failed to
promote "good" patterns of social behavior but has been a source of
unnecessary hardship and misery.
What we need is a comprehensive survey of the entire field of
family law presenting for each of its subdivisions a careful evaluation
of the extent, if any, to which the legal norms and institutions have
been adapted to the needs of our rapidly changing time. Considering
the complexity of the problems, the coexistence of old, new, and all
sorts of intermediate social needs, the diversity of our several state
laws, and the inconclusiveness of many of the attempted adaptations,
the task will not be easy. It cannot be undertaken here. It would
require years of research and reflection. We can do no more than
present some sketchy impressions.
Let us observe at the very outset that nowhere in the United States
has the response to the new demands been as decisive as it has been
in the Scandinavian countries. There, as we have stated already, the
tasks were easier. The population is more homogeneous, the changes
have proceeded at a more even rate, and the machinery of law
adaptation is simpler and more efficient. The response of American
law can also be said to lag behind that of such countries as Great
Britain, Germany, or France, 8 where the extent of industrialization
and urbanization has been approximately equal to that of the United
States, but where the changes have been less even and where the
religious, ethic, and social composition of the population is more
diverse than in Scandinavia.
The field of American family law in which the response has been
relatively best, although by no means fully adequate, has been the
law of husband and wife. The change from the common law rules on
matrimonial property to the latest vintage of married women's prop-
erty laws has been radical. Under the common law a married woman's
property belonged for all practical purposes to her husband; she
could not bind herself by contract, and for torts committed by her
17. See pp. 251-52 infra.
18. Cf. Rheinstein, The Code and the Family, in SCmvARTZ, THE CODE NAPOLEON
AND aE COMON LAW WORLD 139 (1956); Rheinstein, Law of Family and Succession,
in LouisiANA LAw INsTrruTE, Cwim LAw IN THE MODERN WORLD (in press). On
England, see A CENTURY OF FAsL LAw (Graveson & Cran eds. 1957).
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the husband was responsible. The wife's personality was said to have
been merged in that of the husband. Today, a married woman can
own all kinds of property; she can manage and dispose of it freely
and without her husband's consent; she can bind herself by contract
and she is liable for her torts. Not in all states have all these rights,
powers, privileges, and immunities been granted to the full extent,
but the trend is unmistakable and those remnants of the old disabilities
which still linger on are apparently bound to disappear. Women,
unmarried and married, have stepped out of the kitchen; they have
entered the economy of the nation as well as its political life. We
are inclined in the United States to believe that the economic, social,
and political emancipation of women has been more complete than
anywhere else. It is not. It is easier for a woman to establish herself
in business or in the professions in Scandinavia and Germany. But
woman's ascent has been marked in the United States 9 and the law
has responded by giving her not only the franchise and the capacity
to hold political office but also full, or almost full, personality in the
field of private law.
However, the corresponding conclusions have not been drawn for
the husband. Under the old regime the husband owned all the
property; he was entitled to the earnings of all the family members
bf the household, i.e., to those of his wife as well as those of the
children. Consequently, and with good reason, he alone had to carry
the burden of supporting the whole family. No contribution was
expected from the wife. Indeed, how could it be? She had no
income of her own, either from work or from capital. Now, with
married women able not only to own their own property but also
to have their own income, the reason is gone for the old rule which
placed the entire burden of support upon the husband. But courts are
still prone to say that a husband's burden fully to provide for his
wife's support is neither eliminated nor even alleviated by the wife's
having earnings of her own, or by her ability to earn her own living
by work or to defray her support from the income of her capital.20
In fact, this obsolete rule is largely ignored by courts in fixing awards
of alimony, separate maintenance, or child support. The wife's in-
come, her earnings, or her earning capacity are in fact considered,
especially by trial courts.2 ' However, the courts are not consistent,
and appellate courts in particular are by no means unlikely still to
19. See BORGESE, AscEN oF WoMAN 172 (1963).
20. Cf. Churchward v. Churchward, 132 Conn. 72, 42 A.2d 659 (1945); McFerren
v. Goldsmith-Stem Co., 137 Md. 573, 113 Atl. 107 (1921); Bonanno v. Bonanno, 4 N.J.
268, 72 A.2d 318 (1950).
21. See Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties Between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L.
REv. 709, 719 (1956).
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treat a husband's duty to support his wife as an absolute one, as it
was in those days in which all the family income was united in the
husband-father's hands. Perhaps the courts have been reluctant to
bury the old rule because female emancipation has not been complete
in the United States, because the American labor market does not
need a great influx of women, and because our institutions for day
care of children are insufficient to allow mothers of small children to
work outside of the home. But the need is not for a flat denial of
all female claims of support against husbands or ex-husbands, merely
for a flexible rule which would not only allow but direct the courts
in determining amounts of separate maintenance, alimony, and child
support to pay attention to the fact that married women can, and
often do, have an income of their own, and in appropriate circum-
stances ought to work, and that there is no reason why a wife's
income ought any longer be immune to being used for providing
for her needs and for those of her children. After all, why should
Mrs. Milquetoast, a millionairess or a female movie star, be allowed to
lay up all her income in savings and to claim all her support from
her husband Caspar?
While with respect to marital property the response of the law has
by and large been adequate to the need, excepting the continued
immunity of wives to contribute to their own support and to that of
the children, the response has been too eager with respect to tort
claims between members of the nuclear family, especially spouses.
Regarding husband and wife as but one person, the common law
could not recognize tort claims between them. When under the
married women's property acts it became possible for married women
to own property of their own, it also became necessary to protect this
property against impairment by outsiders as well as by the husband.
To this need American law has responded, as well as to its counterpart
of protecting a married man's property against impairment by his
wife. But what about personal injury claims between husband and
wife? In this respect a constantly accelerating trend has arisen in
the courts toward allowance of claims of this kind.22 Courts have
taken cognizance of female emancipation in fact and in law, as well
as of the opening of the automobile age. More and more courts
wish to be modem and they believe that they can prove their openness
to modem needs by admitting interspousal claims for damages for
personal injury.
But is there a need for admitting such claims? If a married woman
comes to grief in an automobile accident, it is incumbent upon her
22. For a survey of the case law, see JACOBS & GOEBEL, GASS ON DOMESTIC BELA-
TIoNs 565 (4th ed. 1961).
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husband to pay the cost of her medical treatment, her hospitalization,
and her druggist's bill. If she has been working in the household, on
the farm, or in the family business, the loss of her work is the hus-
band's. If there is to be hired a housemaid, a nurse for the children,
or a substitute help on the farm or in the business, the pay has to
come out of the husband's pocket. If the wife's injury was brought
about by the negligence of some third party, the loss items first
enumerated are the husband's and he is the party, and, in general
principle, the only party who is entitled to recover from the tort-
feasor.2 If the injury happens to have been caused by the husband
he would have to recover from himself, which of course would be
nonsense. But, surely, the wife cannot recover from him compen-
satory damages for harms which are actually his rather than hers.
Injury to the wife for which damages are recoverable from a third
party by her can conceivably consist of two items: impairment of
future earning power and physical or mental pain and suffering.
Impairment of the wife's earning power is her loss rather than her
husband's if she has in fact been engaged in gainful outside work or
if she is likely in the foreseeable future to engage in such work. If
there has been such a loss, it is the wife's, and if it was caused by
the tortious conduct of a third party, it is she who can recover for
it rather than her husband. Since the physical or mental pain and
suffering have been sustained by her, recovery for its compensation
is again hers rather than his. Whether the husband should in addi-
tion be entitled to compensation for the mental pain he suffered in
watching his wife suffer her pain is a different question. If the tort-
feasor is an outsider, a married woman can recover from him for the
two items. Should she also recover if the tortfeasor is her husband?
Damages for pain and suffering are a strange institution.2 4  Uni-
versally they are called compensatory rather than punitive25 The
function is not that of punishing a tortfeasor for seriously reprehen-
sible conduct. That function is performed by the imposition of
23. See Blaecbinska v. Howard Mission & Home, 130 N.Y. 497, 29 N.E. 755 (1892);
N.Y. Dommrc RELATIONS LAW § 60.
24. As to the problematic nature of the pretium doloris (compensatory damages for
non-pecuniary harm), cf. LmuANN, .RECHT DER ScIuLDv'u-.LTNssE 972 (14th ed.
1959); MAZEAuD, MAZEAuD & TuNc, RESPoNsABmrrE CIrV. 376, and further litera-
ture indicated therein; see also JAoscH, MuLEmR & PIEGLER, DAS SCHMEBZENSGELD IN
MEDiZnmscRm UND JURISTrscmm Sicsrr (1962).
In the Netherlands, pecuniary damages for non-pecuniary harm were generally refused
until the Supreme Court reluctantly admitted their possibility in 1934; see Kisch,
Statutory Construction in a New Key, in TwENTmTH CENTURY COMPARATrVE & CON-
FuCTs LA W 262 (1961).
On American law, of. Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 200
(1958).
25. See McConmicK, D.AmAGEs 316 (1935).
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criminal punishment and of punitive civil damages. The damages for
pain and suffering are meant to "compensate" the tort victim, that is,
to make him whole, to restore him to that state in which he would
have been if the tort had not been committed against him-in our
case if the pain and suffering had not been caused him. But how can
any pain that has actually been suffered ever be undone? Besides,
what manly man cares about pain that has passed? As the law can
generally do no more than order a defendant to pay money to the
plaintiff, the question of whether or not money damages shall be
awarded for pain and suffering is answered differently in different
legal systems. In recent years the trend has been toward an affirma-
tive answer; in American law money damages for pain and suffering
have long been an established institution. But how is the proper
amount to be figured? By leaving the question to the jury, we may
practically dispose of it in most cases, although not in all. We need
some test for the determination of the proper amount. If we take
seriously the compensatory function, damages for pain and suffering
can be figured solely upon the following basis: By suffering pain the
mental well-being of the tort victim has been pushed down below
its normal level. The sight of a fat check can push it up again. How
fat does the check have to be to restore the victim's previous level of
mental well-being? When seen in this way, the payment of money
may indeed be an appropriate means of compensation. Where the
tortfeasor is an outsider, it seems indeed the only practicable one.
But what if the tortfeasor is the husband of the tort victim? Is money
the only, indeed, is it the apposite means at the disposal of a husband
to cheer up his injured wife? The gift of a diamond brooch may work
wonders, but it does so primarily because it is a gift, the object of
voluntary giving. And the ways in which a husband can cheer up
his wife are manifold; but hardly any of them is likely to count if
it is entered under the compulsion of a court's judgment. In other
words, a judgment ordering a husband to pay to his wife damages
for pain and suffering is unnecessary, inappropriate, and downright
shocking.
Hence the only item that remains for a married woman to recover
from her husband is that of compensation for the impairment or loss
of the power to engage in the future in gainful work outside of the
house or the farm or the family business. This item will exist in
some cases, but not in all. Whether or not it should be recoverable
when it exists is by no means certain where the action is by a married
woman against her husband. But if such recovery is admitted, it
ought to be limited exactly to compensation for the impairment of
the power to engage in future outside work.
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Yet no such limitation seems to be applied by that steadily in-
creasing number of courts in which personal injury claims between
spouses are being allowed. The measure of recovery seems to be exactly
the same as if the suit were against a third party. The oft-made obser-
vation that intrafamily personal injury actions would tend to disturb
family peace and harmony can easily be refuted by the observation
that both plaintiff and defendant are acting in full peace and harmony
-they are harmoniously engaged in a joint expedition to milk the
insurance company. But is it justified to make the husband's in-
surer pay? Yes, if the husband has taken out a policy of family
accident insurance; no, if he has taken out liability insurance. These
two kinds of insurance provide protection against different risks. If
I take out family accident insurance I wish to protect myself against
the risk of impairment of my income or capital by having to pay
expenses caused by an accident to myself or a member of my family.
The cause of the accident is irrelevant. By taking out liability insur-
ance, I wish to protect myself and my family against the risk of
having my resources depleted by being compelled to pay damages
to some outsider. Liability insurance is not designed to shift losses
within the family; this is the function of family accident insurance,
for which the premiums are much higher. In recent judicial practice
these two kinds of insurance have come to be confused with each
other. This confusion was speeded by the transformation of auto-
mobile liability insurance from a device to protect an owner and
driver into one to protect victims of automobile accidents. The prin-
cipal means has been the direct action of the victim against the in-
surance company. If any outside victim may sue the owner's insurer,
why should one exclude his wife? If the question is posed in that
way, no good reason is indeed apparent for a negative answer. But
should the question be posed in this manner? Should we not rather
ask: In the case of an accident suffered by a married woman, which
items of harm are suffered at all by her? Insofar as any harm is hers
rather than her husband's we must then ask: Is there a good reason
why she should receive compensation by means of a payment of
money damages by her husband? And ultimately we should ask:
Is the risk of loss suffered by a married woman in consequence of an
accident caused by her husband's negligence within the scope of risk
as to which the husband's insurer has calculated his premium? If
it is, recovery from the insurance company is justified; if not, recovery
from the insurance company is a taking of its property without com-
pensation. The whole question is one of insurance law rather than
family law.
26
26. This insight found expression when the New York legislature in 1937 combined
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It follows from what has been said that there is no reason to deny
recovery by an injured married woman against her husband's em-
ployer, assuming the doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable to
the particular case. The employer's insurance is meant exactly to
protect him and his enterprise against depletion by claims arising
out of accidents caused by employees. The fact that the victim is
the wife of the employee by whom the accident was caused is
irrelevant to the insurer.27 The fear that the employer may sue the
employee and that the burden will ultimately be placed upon the
victim's husband is imaginary. The typical business liability policy
covers both the firm and its employees.
The reason why the courts have been led astray is not easily ap-
parent on the surface. In their eagerness to meet the challenge of a
changed social world in which the family has been transformed with
respect to size, structure, and functions, courts and legislatures have
come to overlook the fact that the family still exists as a social unit.
Our married women's property acts have tended to regard a husband
and his wife as two individuals who have no more in common than two
strangers. At least as far as property is concerned, the law of the
great majority of American states proceeds upon the assumption that
he owns his property and she owns hers, that he manages his and
she manages hers, and that there is nothing in common between them
insofar as their property assets are concerned. That assumption is
unrealistic. It is contradicted by the law itself, when it recognizes
mutual rights of intestate succession, of indefeasible shares, of dower,
homestead, or the surviving spouses' award. The assumption is also
wrong in fact. It will be a rare family, especially in the American
middle class, in which each spouse knows exactly which piece of
furniture or kitchen equipment is his or hers. They regard these items
as theirs, just as the checking and the savings account is normally
taken out in the couple's joint names; and even if savings are in-
vested in bonds or stock taken out in the name of the
husband or the wife, they tend to regard such denomination as a
form which does not correspond to what they regard as the true
state of affairs-that the assets are theirs. Perhaps separate ownership
the enactment of a statute allowing personal injury suits between husband and wife
(Dom-.sTic RELAMTIONS LAW § 57) with an amendment of INSURANCE LAW § 167(3),
which now reads as follows: "No policy or contract shall be deemed to insure against
any liability of an insured because of death of or injuries to his or her spouse . . .unless
express provision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy." Where such a
provision is included in the policy, the insured has, of course, to pay a higher
premium.
27. Against recovery: Riegger v. Burton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99
(1940). Recovery allowed: May v. Palm Beach Chem. Co., 77 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1955);
Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
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is more frequently regarded as a reality with respect to real estate.
Generally, however, it can be said that in the present-day American
lower and middle class family the husband and his wife tend to
regard the bulk of their assets as being owned jointly rather than
separately. Evidence of this sentiment can be found in the common
practice of holding assets in joint tenancy and in the will makers'
practice of seeing to it that all those assets which were owned and
enjoyed by the couple are left complete to the use and enjoyment of
the survivor. In sentiment and in fact the family is as much a social
unit today as it was in the past. But our law, trying to be modem,
closes its eyes to this fact and deals with a husband and his wife as if
they were strangers to each other. The law's response has gone beyond
the need.
The unrealistic system of separation of assets is likely to result in
difficulties whenever it becomes necessary to separate the husband's
assets from those of the wife, i.e., in the cases of death, attachment,
bankruptcy, and divorce. It would be interesting to know what these
difficulties are and how they are overcome. In spite of its apparent
contrast with reality the system functions. How? With respect to
divorce one is most easily inclined to believe that the law's response
to changing needs has been unsatisfactory. But has the divorce law
ever been adequate? Before one can discuss whether or not the re-
sponse is commensurate to the needs, one has to determine what the
needs are. In a country like Spain the answer is easy: maintain the
Catholic doctrine of indissolubility of marriage. The answer is also
clear in Sweden: the divorce law is to correspond to the ideals of a
non-Catholic, extensively secularized society in which equality of
the sexes is taken seriously and marriage is regarded not only as the
institution to perpetuate the human race but also as one of the
principal means for the pursuit of human happiness. In consequence,
while marriage continues to be expected to be for life, divorce and,
consequently, remarriage, have been made easy.
But what are the needs felt in the society of the United States?
While the processes of industrialization, urbanization, and female
emancipation are going on, individual families are likely to be up-
rooted and a marriage concluded under one set of conditions may
easily cease to function under different ones. Furthermore, and even
more important, in a society of transition ideas of what to expect in
and of marriage are likely to be unsettled. Profound social change
thus produces a rising rate of marriage breakdown and, consequently,
a strong demand for easy divorce. Once conditions become settled
again, the curve of marriage breakdown incidence tends to flatten out,
although the new plateau will be higher in the "modem" industrial-
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ized society than it was in the pre-industrial2
In the United States, we have been in this process of transition for
about one hundred years and it is by no means completed. Besides,
even where a family has externally been engulfed by the stream of
industrialization and urbanization, the mental adjustment takes time.
It is unlikely to occur with the first generation subjected to the new
conditions. Just because they feel their traditional ways to be
threatened, the old-timers are likely to maintain the old-time ideals
with particular tenacity. In the United States we thus have no unity
of normative views about marriage. The conservative ideal of in-
dissoluble marriage lives side by side with the liberal demand for
easy divorce and remarriage. Under such circumstances the best we
can expect of the law is that it constitute a compromise between
the divergent demands. The compromise has been brought about by
the coexistence of a strict divorce law of the books and a law of easy
divorce in action.29 In most of our states the official law of the
statute book is strict. No divorce is to be granted unless one spouse
has committed a grave marital offense, such as adultery, desertion, or
cruelty, and even where one party is guilty of such misconduct,
restoration to the freedom of the marriage market is not to take place
unless the plaintiff has been blameless in his or her marital conduct.
Judging from the statute book, it is not easy to obtain a divorce. In
fact a divorce can be obtained, one is tempted to say, for the asking,
provided the parties can work out their own scheme of property,
alimony, and custody settlement, and have sufficient funds to
go to Reno or to engage an experienced divorce lawyer. This diver-
gence of the law in action from the law of the books has been
criticized, and suggestions for reform have been made. The most
influential among them has been the so-called family court plan. It
will be as unsatisfactory an answer as any other plan so long as we
have no unanimity of norm patterns about marriage and divorce.
In conclusion we shall mention that topic of family law where the
law has utterly failed to respond to the needs of life: minors' con-
tracts and guardianship. Present American law is based upon the
forgotten assumptions that as soon as a minor has any property be
will also have a guardian, that, if there is to be made any transaction
involving the minor's property, the guardian will go into action, and
that consequently there is no need for any transactions ever to be
28. For statistics, see JACOBS, AmER cAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (1959); Platers,
Statistical Data on Marriage Stability, 9 ANNALES DE LA FAcIJLTE DE Dnorr D'ISTANIIUL
253 (1960).
29. See Rheinstein, Our Dual Law of Divorce: The Law in Action and the Law of




made by the minor except in situations of such urgent emergency
that the guardian's intervention cannot be waited for. Excepting such
cases of emergency, nobody within his senses is thus expected ever
to deal with a minor. If anybody is rash or dishonest enough never-
theless to deal with a minor for any purpose other than providing
him with "necessaries," i.e., emergency food, shelter, or urgent medical
services, it serves him right if the transaction is disaffirmed by the
minor and he, the other party, loses what he has given or paid to
the minor.
This system might be adequate to the needs of society if its under-
lying assumptions were correct. Whether they ever were correct in the
United States is doubtful. They are clearly not correct today. In
contrast to guardianship of the person, which arises "naturally" in the
father or, under modem statutes, in both father and mother, of a
child at the moment of his birth, no one can be guardian of a minor's
property without being appointed by decree of court, and, upon
general principle, no one is to be appointed, not even the father,
without first having given bond. Popular opinion seems to take it
for granted that the father, qua father, is the guardian of both his
child's person and his property. This popular notion is erroneous
and the discrepancy between the popular view and the law constitutes
the source of difficulties, which, although widely ignored, are serious,
and which would be intolerable if it were more generally known what
the law is and what an arsenal of weapons it has placed into the
hands of minors. Contrary to often repeated dicta, infancy can be
used not only as a shield but also as a sword. If Yokum Youngman
has purchased a second-hand car for 500 dollars, has paid 400 dollars,
still owes the rest, and then drives the car into a lamp post, he may,
upon returning the wreck to the dealer, not only keep his 100 dollars
but also recover the 400 dollars already paid.30 Some courts have gone
even futher: If at the time of disaffirmance the minor, or former
minor, can no longer return in kind what he has received from the
other party because he has sold it, he may keep the price received
in his resale and nevertheless recover from his seller what he has
paid to him.31 Such a refusal to trace the consideration received by
the minor is a clear misapplication of the existing law. But even
where tracing is allowed, the present law allowing the infant to
plead impossibility of return of the consideration, in kind or as
30. See, e.g., McGuckian v. Carpenter, 43 R.I. 94, 110 Ati. 402 (1920).
31. See, e.g., Arkansas Reo Motor Car Co. v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S.W. 975
(1924); Wooldridge v. Hill, 124 Ind. App. 11, 114 N.E.2d 646 (1953); Reynolds v.
Garber Brick Co., 183 Mich. 157, 149 N.W. 985 (1914); Gage v. Moor, 200 Okla.
623, 198 P.2d 395 (1948). But see Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. 18 (1927);
Rush v. Grevey, 90 Ohio App. 536, 107 N.E.2d 560 (1951); Pettit v. Liston, 97 Ore.
464, 191 Pac. 660 (1920).
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traceable, is intolerable in a time in which minors do have property
and adults do not hesitate to deal with them. The age at which
minors begin to be gainfully employed is higher today than it was in
the olden days. School-leaving age has been raised and more young
people go to college than ever before. But when the young people
begin to earn, they earn more than in earlier times, and parents are less
anxious to receive the son's or daughter's pay check, even though
under the law they are still entitled thereto. The young man uses
his earnings to buy cigarettes, to take his date out, or to purchase a
car, a record collection, or other expensive items. The law that allows
him to repudiate all his engagements is so out of tune with reality
and need that it is as little known in the business world as the rule
of Foakes v. Beer.' It seems to be little known, too, that the law
expects, nay, requires, that for every youthful wage earner the
probate court appoint a guardian who will take on the manage-
ment of the youngster's earnings. In fact it is hit and miss whether
a guardian will be appointed to manage funds coming to minors as
legacies, life insurance payments, or gifts. If the minor does not get
hold of such funds, they are likely to be taken on by parents or
relatives who, subject to no control, may manage or mismanage,
preserve or dissipate them. Unfortunately we know little of what
actually happens to minors' funds. A study that was initiated some
years ago by the United States Children's Bureau could not be com-
pleted because in one of its economy moods Congress cut off the
appropriation.3 The material that was discovered before the in-
quiry had to be abandoned indicates the absence of any comprehen-
sive efforts to protect minors' funds and the presence of widespread
mismanagement, both involuntary and intentional.
The invitation to write for this symposium on Stability and Change
Through Law a short article about challenges and responses in
the field of family law has been a challenge. I accepted it hesitatingly.
The time limit allowed was too short to permit investigation or
elaboration. However, it has given me an opportunity to express
some judgments I have come to form in some thirty years of occupa-
tion with family law. With one exception all these judgments are
based on general impression rather than systematic incisive research.
A topic on which extensive research has been undertaken is that of
divorce; the result will, I hope, be published in the near future.
What we need in the family field is research. Before we can begin
sensibly to reform the present law we must know what the needs
are. That means we must know what are the actual patterns of
32. L.R. 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
33. CmLDRmN's BuREAU, GUARDIANSHIP (Pub. No. 330, 1949).
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behavior of all the numerous and different groups of our hetero-
geneous nation; we must know what normative ideas are actually
maintained by these groups of our people. Only then can we know
what the needs are which the law is supposed to satisfy. Next we
must know what the present law is. That knowledge is by no means
clear. Several fields of family law are in such a state of confusion
that it is hardly possible to state with certainty what the law is. We
have already pointed out the confused state of the law of guardianship
and of infants' contracts. The state of clarity is hardly better as to
the law of nullity and annulment of marriages, of alimony, or of
child support, just to name a few examples. What we need in family
law is research-research on the law, on the facts of family life, on
the normative ideas actually entertained, and on the law itself. If
the present sketch should stimulate some such research, it will have
served its purpose.

